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Using a Firearm during and in Relation to a Drug
Trafficking Crime: Defining the Elements of the
Mandatory Sentencing Provision
of 18 USC § 924(c)(1)
Michael J. Riordan*
INTRODUCTION
The concept of mandatory, minimum sentencing is not a new
phenomenon to the federal criminal justice system. As early as
1790, mandatory minimum penalties were established for capital
offenses.1 Throughout the 19th century, Congress enacted provi-
sions that required definite prison terms, typically quite short, for
a variety of other crimes.2 However, until recently, the enactment
of mandatory minimum sentencing provisions was an occasional
occurrence that was not comprehensively aimed at a whole class of
offenses.3
A change in practice occurred with the passage of the Narcotic
Control Act of 1956, 4 which mandated minimum sentences of con-
siderable length for most drug importation and distribution of-
fenses.5 In 1970 Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act.' With the passage of the 1970 Act,
Congress retreated from the comprehensive application of
mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes which it had en-
acted fourteen years earlier and repealed virtually all mandatory
penalties for drug violations.7 Congress reasoned that increases in
* J.D., 1990, University of Detroit School of Law;, Law Clerk to the Honorable Rob-
ert E. DeMascio, United States District Judge, Eastern District of Michigan; Member, State
Bar of Michigan.
1. United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the
Federal Criminal Justice System 5 (1991).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Pub L No 84-728, 70 Stat 651 (1956), codified at 8 USC §§ 1182, 1251 (1956).
5. Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System at 5
(cited in note 1). As with all mandatory minimums, the sentence imposed could not be
suspended or reduced. Id at 6.
6. Pub L No 91-513, 84 Stat 1236 (1970) codified at 21 USC § 801 et seq (1970).
7. Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (cited in
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sentence length "had not shown the expected overall reduction in
drug law violations."8 However, in the 1980's a shift in attitude
toward sentencing once again occurred." The change was primarily
attributable to the bipartisan belief that rehabilitation of criminals
was difficult to accomplish and by widespread dissatisfaction with
judicial discretion in sentencing, which critics argued actually ex-
acerbated the problems of controlling crime.' 0 This dissatisfaction
resulted in renewed support for mandatory minimum penalties, es-
pecially for crimes involving narcotics offenses." Beginning in
1984, and every two years thereafter, Congress enacted an array of
mandatory minimum penalties specifically targeted at drugs and
violent crime. In 1984, Congress amended 18 USC § 924(c), incor-
porating an automatic five-year mandatory minimum sentence for
the use or carrying of a firearm during a crime of violence.' 2 Re-
sponding to public concern over increased narcotics-related crimes,
and as part of its war on drugs, Congress applied mandatory mini-
mum sentencing to drug crimes in the Firearm Owners' Protection
Act of 1986.13 The Firearm Owners' Protection Act extended the
five-year mandatory minimum sentence enhancement of 18 USC §
924(c) to situations where a firearm is used or carried during or in
relation to a drug trafficking crime.
14
Since section 924(c)(1.) was revised in 1986, it has been subject to
varying interpretations by courts seeking to determine under what
circumstances a person "during and in relation to . . . [a] drug
trafficking crime. . . uses or carries a firearm."' 5 This article pro-
vides guidance to the federal courts and practitioners in applying
the mandatory sentencing provision of 18 USC § 924(c)(1) in rela-
tion to drug trafficking crimes. It analyzes the impact of the words
"during or in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime" on the
construction and application of 18 USC § 924(c)(1) since the insti-
note 1).
8. Id, quoting Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, S Rep No
91-613, 91st Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1969).
9. Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (cited in
note 1).
10. Id.
11. Id at 7-8.
12. 18 USC § 924(c)(1)-(2) (1984).
13. Pub L No 99-308, 100 Stat 449 (1968), codified at 18 USC § 921 (1986).
14. 18 USCA § 924(c)(1) (West Supp 1991). In addition, in 1988 Congress passed the
Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 which amended 21 USC § 844 and 21 USC § 848(a).
Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System 9 (cited in note 1).
15. 18 USCA § 924(c)(1) (West Supp 1991). See note 16 and accompanying text for
the full version of 18 USC § 924(c)(1).
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tution of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, and the
amendments of the Firearm Owners' Protection Act of 1986. Back-
ground information on the present version of section 924(c)(1) is
provided. It defines the "during or in relation to" elements of the
statute, examines the application of section 924(c)(1) to drug traf-
ficking crimes and, finally, scrutinizes the statute's constitutional
implications in relation to drug trafficking crimes.
I. BACKGROUND
18 USC § 924(c)(1) mandates a five year sentence for using or
carrying a firearm during and in relation to any drug trafficking
crime. Section 924(c)(1) provides:
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime which provides
for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or danger-
ous weapon or device) for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the
United States, uses or carries a firearm shall in addition to the punishment
provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced
to imprisonment for five years .... Notwithstanding any other provision of
law the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of any
person convicted of a violation of this subsection nor shall the term of im-
prisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any other
term of imprisonment including that imposed for the crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime in which the firearm was used or carried. No person
sentenced under this subsection shall be eligible for parole during the term
of imprisonment imposed herein.16
Section 924(c)(1) is an enhancing statute. The single purpose of
the statute is to impose more severe penalties where firearms actu-
ally or potentially facilitated the commission of a drug trafficking
crime. 17 The statute is part of the war on drugs the United States
has waged over the past twenty-five" years. Although section 924(c)
was originally enacted in 1968, Congress amended the statute and
included it in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (here-
inafter "CCCA").'8 "The CCCA was an elaborate crime bill which
16. 18 USCA § 924(c)(1) (West Supp 1991) (emphasis added).
17. United States v Stewart, 779 F2d 538, 540 (9th Cir 1985) (opinion by J.
Kennedy).
18. Comment, Federal Sentencing Enhancement: Mandatory Penalties for Firearms
Use Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 19 Loyola LA L Rev 823 (1986).
The original § 924(c) stated:
Whoever-
(1) uses a firearm to commit a felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the
United States, or
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony for which he may
1991
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encompassed issues such as bail reform, narcotics enforcement, for-
feiture, and sentencing."' 9 Ii Title II of the CCCA,20 Congress
sought to achieve various sentencing reforms which are consistent
with the creation of the modified section 924(c) (1).21 Congress es-
tablished the United States Sentencing Commission to promulgate
detailed sentencing guidelines.22 The sentencing guidelines are not
just advisory; the federal courts are required to follow them.2 3 Con-
gress' strict approach toward parole provisions in Title II is appar-
ent in section 924(c), which forbids parole. 24 The mandatory non-
parolable five year sentence requirement in section 924(c)(1) is
consistent with Congress' goal of limiting a federal judge's discre-
tion in imposing sentences.25
be prosecuted in a court of the United States, shall in addition to the punishment
provided for the commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
for not less than one year nor more than ten years. In the case of his second or subse-
quent conviction under this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for not less than two nor more than twenty-five years and, notwith-
standing any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence in the
case of a second or subsequent conviction of such person or give him a probationary
sentence, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run con-
currently with any term of imprisonment imposed for the commission of such felony.
18 USC § 924(c)(1)-(2) (1984).
Section 924(c) originally required a conviction for either the use or the unlawful carrying
of a firearm during any felony. Comment, Loyola LA L Rev at 826 (emphasis added) (cited
in this note). The statute required that in addition to the punishment provided for the
felony itself, a defendant would be sentenced for not less than one year or more than ten
years..
19. Comment, 19 Loyola LA L Rev at 823 (cited in note 18).
The CCCA was enacted on October 12, 1984. CCCA of 1984. Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat
3182 (1984), codified at 18 USC § 924(c)(1) (1984).
On March 16, 1983, President Reagan presented Congress with a legislative proposal enti-
tled the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983. He emphasized that his administration
was interested in "improv[ing] the efficiency and coordination of Federal law enforcement,
with special emphasis on violent and drug related crime." 129 Cong Rec 3160 (March 17,
1983). President Reagan said, "[i]f the forces of law are to regain the upper hand over the
forces of crime, ensuring that criminals are put and kept behind bars, basic legislative
changes are needed." Id.
20. Title II also abolished the United States Parole Commission. 18 USCA § 3583
(West Supp 1991). It curtailed "good-time release" by making its accrual more definitive
and less discretionary. Id. "These changes are meant to result in more predictable prison
terms." Comment, Loyola LA L Rev at 834 note 4 (cited in note 18).
21. Senator Edward M. Kennedy called the sentencing reform provisions of the
CCCA "the most dramatic and important reforms in the entire crime package." Senator
Edward M. Kennedy, Forward to 22 Am Crim L Rev at vii (1985).
22. 28 USCA § 991 (West Supp 1991).
23. 28 USCA § 994 (West Supp 1991).
24. Comment, 19 Loyola LA L Rev at 834 note 4 (cited in note 18).
25. For a full reading of 18 USC § 924(c)(1) see the text accompanying note 16.
Criticisms directed at the CCCA included the effect mandatory sentencing would have on
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Prior to 1984, section 924(c) made it an offense to "carry a fire-
arm unlawfully during the commission of a felony. '26 When the
statute was rewritten as part of the CCCA, the term "unlawfully"
was eliminated, and the phrase "in relation to" was added.2 7 The
current language of section 924(c)(1) was added to the statute by
amendment in 1986 as part of the Firearms Owners' Protection
Act.28 The 1986 amendment added "drug trafficking crime" to the
"any crime of violence" language. The statute now makes it an of-
fense "during or in relation to any. . . drug trafficking crime" to
use or carry a firearm.2 The 1984 addition of the "in relation to"
language was intended to explicitly allay the concern that a person
could be prosecuted under section 924(c) for committing an en-
tirely unrelated crime while in possession of a firearm.30
II. DEFINING "DURING OR IN RELATION TO . . ."
When Congress revamped section 924(c) by substituting the
phrase "during and in relation to" and eliminating the require-
ment that the firearm be carried unlawfully, it sought to preclude
the section's application to situations "where a weapon's presence
the sentencing discretion usually employed by federal judges, and the inability of judges to
consider each individual defendant on a case by case basis. Comment, 19 Loyola LA L Rev
at 832 note 4 (cited in note 18), citing Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong, 1st Sess 80 (1981). The criticisms also included that the mandatory sentencing would
also aggravate prison overcrowding. Id.
In Simpson v United States, 435 US 6 (1978), the Supreme Court decided the pre-1984
§ 924(c)(1)&(2) could not be used to increase a defendant's sentence when the defendant
was already receiving enhanced punishment for carrying a firearm under the state statute
for the felony he committed. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, found that the federal
enhancing statute was ambiguous and that legislative history and established rules of statu-
tory construction require that ambiguity concerning the scope of criminal statutes should be
resolved in favor of lenity. Simpson, 435 US at 14, quoting United States v Bass, 404 US
336, 347 (1971).
Congress responded to the Supreme Court's interpretation by amending § 924(c) and
making it clear that a court must sentence a defendant to an additional five years, regard-
less of whether any other statutes require additional sentencing for the use of a firearm.
Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 USCA § 924(c) (West Supp 1985). See also Comment, 19
Loyola LA L Rev at 828 note 37 (cited in note 18).
26. 18 USC § 924(c)(1)-(2) (1984). See note 18 for the full text of the statute.
27. See text accompanying note 1 for the full version of the statute.
28. Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub L No 99-308, 100 Stat 456 (1986), codified
at 18 USC § 924(c)(1) (1986). The Firearms Owners' Protection Act was enacted on May 19,
1986.
29. 18 USCA § 924(c)(1) (West Supp 1991). See note 16 and accompanying text for
the full version of the statute.
30. Id.
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played no part in the crime." 1 The legislative history reveals Con-
gress aimed to ensure that the statute did not punish people in
instances where the presence of the firearm was merely coinciden-
tal and unrelated to the drug trafficking offense. 2 Apparently,
Congress was concerned that, with the removal of the pre-1984 "re-
quirement that the firearm be carried unlawfully, the statute could
be applied to people who lawfully, but inadvertently, possessed a
gun . . . in unrelated criminal activity."33 Congress said the re-
quirement that the firearm's use or possession be "in relation to"
the crime would preclude the application of section 924(c)(1) to a
situation where the firearm's presence played no part in the crime,
such as a gun carried in a pocket and never displayed, or referred
to in the course of a pugilistic barroom fight.
3 4
As in all cases of statutory interpretation, the starting point for
an analysis of section 924(c)(1) is the plain language employed by
Congress. 5 Congress stated, "whoever, during and in relation to
any . . . drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm"36
shall be subject to an additional five years of imprisonment.37 The
government thus has the burden of establishing a relationship be-
tween the firearm possessed by the defendant and the predicate
drug trafficking offense.38
Section 924(c) is not a specific intent offense." The legislative
31. United States v Wilson, 884 F2d 174, 176-77 (5th Cir 1989), citing Continuing
Appropriations, 1985 - Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, S Rep No 98-225, 98th
Cong, 2nd Sess 314 n.10 (1983), reprinted in US Code Cong & Admin News 3182, 3942 n.10
(1984).
32. US Code Cong & Admin News at 3490-92.
33. United States v Brown, 915 F2d 219, 225 (6th Cir 1990).
34. S Rep No 98-225 at 314 n.10 (cited in note 31).
35. Indiana Port Comm. v Bethlehem Steel Corp., 835 F2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir 1982).
See also United States v Rawlings, 821 F2d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir 1987) (when examining §
924(c) "we must assume that Congress used the words of the statute as they are commonly
and ordinarily understood.")
36. 18 USCA § 924(c)(1) (West Supp 1991).
37. Id.
38. Wilson, 884 F2d at 177.
39. Brown, 915 F2d at 225. Where the definition of a crime requires some forbidden
act by the defendant, his bodily movement, to qualify as an act, must be voluntary. Wayne
R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 28 at 201 (West 1972). The notion is
sometimes summed up with the expression that all crimes require a "general intent."
LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law § 28 at 201 (cited within this note). Courts have taken the
view that intent may be presumed only as to general intent. Id at 202.
The common usage of "specific intent" is to designate a special mental element which is
required above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the physical act of the
crime. Id. Common law larceny, for example, requires the taking and carrying away of prop-
erty of another, and the defendant's mental state as to this act must be established, but in
Vol. 30:39
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history of the 1984 amendment indicates that the "in relation to"
language was not intended to create an element of the crime that
did not previously exist.40 The general rule of construction of a
criminal statute provides that where a statute does not specify a
heightened mental element, such as specific intent, general intent
is presumed to be the required element.,1 Section 924(c)(1) does
not explicitly use terms such as "knowingly" or "willfully," the sci-
enter language generally found in statutes creating specific intent
offenses. 42 It appears that Congress merely intended to emphasize
a condition already implicit in the statute: that there be a relation-
ship between the weapon and the predicate crime of drug
trafficking.'4
In United States v Nelson," the Fifth Circuit held that a con-
viction under the pre-1984 version of section 924(c) required that
the government prove the defendant "knowingly carried a firearm
.* . -"' The Nelson holding is consistent with the general rule of
statutory construction in that "knowledge of the facts constituting
an offense is ordinarily implied where a statute does not expressly
mention any mental element.' 46 In assessing the scienter require-
ment of section 924(c)(1), case law requires that the government
prove the defendant's conduct was knowing.47 As such, the requi-
addition it must be shown that there was an "intent to steal" the property. Id. Similarly,
common law burglary requires a breaking and entry into the dwelling of another, but in
addition to the mental state connected with these acts it must also be established that the
defendant acted "with intent to commit the felony therein." Id.
40. Stewart, 779 F2d at 539 (opinion by J. Kennedy), citing S Rep No 98-225 at 314
n.10 (cited in note 31).
41. Id. See also Wilson, 884 F2d at 178-79; United States v Nelson, 733 F2d 364,
370-71 (5th Cir 1984); United States v Barber, 594 F2d 1242, 1244 (9th Cir 1979).
42. Wilson, 884 F2d at 178. Scienter is used to signify a defendant's guilty knowl-
edge. People v Gould, 237 Mich 156, 211 NW 346, 348 (1926).
43. Brown, 915 F2d at 224.
44. 733 F2d 364, 370-71 (5th Cir 1984).
45. Nelson, 733 F2d at 370-71.
46. Wilson, 884 F2d at 178, citing Barber, 594 F2d at 1244. See also Morissette v
United States, 342 US 246 (1951) (wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal).
Subsequent legislative history affirms Nelson. The legislative history of the pre-1984, and
original, version of § 924(c) is sparse. See Simpson, 435 US at 15. "However, a later Con-
gress' understanding of the legislative intent of an earlier Congress is entitled to deference."
Wilson, 884 F2d at 178 n.7, citing Stewart, 779 F2d at 540. "Although comments about an
earlier act in a legislative report on a subsequent bill are not part of the legislative history of
the earlier act ... they are entitled to consideration." Wilson, 884 F2d at 178 n.7, citing N.
Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction §§ 49.11, 412-14 (Callaghan & Co., 4th ed
1984).
47. Wilson, 884 F2d at 178. In 1986, the Firearms Owners' Protection Act set the
stage for a revamping of § 924. Id, citing Firearm Owners' Protection Act, H Rep No 99-495,
99th Cong, 2d Sess 25-26 (1986), reprinted in US Code Cong & Admin News 1327, 1351-53.
1991
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site mental state for a violation of section 924(c) is knowledge of
the facts constituting the offense. 48 A proposal that "willfulness"
be adopted as the mens rea for certain weapons offenses has been
specifically rejected.49
The requirement that there be a relationship between the
weapon and the predicate crime existed prior to the 1984 amend-
ment because the statute originally applied to a limited class of
persons-those persons who carried firearms unlawfully while they
engaged in felonies.5 Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy,
then a judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, concluded in
United States v Stewart51 that, when Congress deleted the limita-
tion that the firearm be carried unlawfully, it added the phrase "in
relation to" in order to limit the element of "during." 52 In reaching
this conclusion, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the Senate re-
port expressly noted significant changes resulting from the 1984
amendments, such as expansion of the statute's reach to "crimes of
violence. ' 53 Yet, the report made no mention of any elements or a
requirement of specific intent, which would have been a significant
change worth noting in a Senate committee report.
5 4
The purpose of the amendments to section 924(c) was to impose
harsher sanctions "where firearms facilitated, or had the potential
of facilitating, the commission of a felony," and, more specifically,
the commission of a drug trafficking crime. 5 The statute necessa-
rily implies some relation or connection between the underlying
criminal act of drug trafficking and the use or possession of the
firearm. 6 The terms "used" and "carried" should be construed
broadly.5 7 Congress did not intend that the statute be given a
cramped reading.5 8 Still, however broadly the terms may be con-
48. Wilson, 884 F2d at 179.
49. Id at 178, citing H Rep No 99-495 at 25-26 (cited in note 47).
50. Stewart, 779 F2d at 539 (opinion by J. Kennedy). Though the legislative history
does not say so expressly, it strongly implies that the "in relation to" language did not alter
the scope of the statute, explaining that "the [original] section was directed at persons who
chose to carry a firearm as an offensive weapon for a specific criminal act." Id at 539-40,
quoting S Rep No 98-225 at 314 n.10 (cited in note 31).
51. 779 F2d 538 (9th Cir 1985).
52. Stewart, 779 F2d at 539.
53. Id at 540.
54. Id.
55. Id. See United States v LaGuardia, 774 F2d 317, 321 (8th Cir 1985); United
States v Mason, 658 F2d 1263, 1270-71 (9th Cir 1981).
56. See United States v Robertson, 706 F2d 253, 256 (8th Cir 1983).
57. United States v Acosta-Cazares, 878 F2d 945, 952 (6th Cir 1989), cert denied,
US -, 110 S Ct 255 (1989).
58. United States v Rosado, 866 F2d 967, 970 (7th Cir 1989), cert denied, - US -,
Vol. 30:39
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strued, section 924(c)(1) will not support a conviction for mere
possession of a firearm during the course of criminal conduct.5"
The "in relation to" language was designed to avoid convictions for
inadvertently carrying a firearm in an unrelated narcotics crime"°
and it connotes a causal connection between the defendant's drug
trafficking crime and the firearm.6 1 The connection must be sup-
ported by ample evidence to permit an inference that the defend-
ant carried the weapon "in relation to" the drug offense.62 The
government has the burden of establishing some relationship be-
tween the firearm the defendant possessed and the predicate drug
trafficking offense.6 3 "The 'in relation to' language connotes a
causal connection between a [defendant's] narcotics felonies and
this firearm .... "'
III. THE ELEMENTS OF SECTION 924(c)(1) AS APPLIED TO DRUG
TRAFFICKING CRIMES
To bring the possession of a firearm within the "uses" provision
of section 924(c)(1), one of the following is required: (1) proof of a
transaction in which the circumstances surrounding the presence
of a firearm suggest the possessor intended to have it available for
possible use during the transaction; or (2) evidence surrounding
the presence of a firearm in a place where a drug transaction takes
place suggest the firearm was strategically located so as to be
quickly and easily available for use during the transaction.6 5 A con-
viction under section 924(c)(1) will stand "if the possessor of a
weapon intended to have it available for possible use during or im-
mediately following the transaction, or if it facilitated the transac-
tion by lending courage to the possessor."66 "The defendant's sole
purpose in carrying the weapon need not have been the facilitation
of the drug trafficking crime, '67 nor is the government required to
show that the defendant displayed or brandished the firearm. 8
110 S Ct 117 (1989).
59. Brown, 915 F2d at 224.
60. United States v Ramos, 861 F2d 228, 231 (9th Cir 1988).
61. Ramos, 861 F2d at 231.
62. Id at 230-31.
63. Wilson, 884 F2d at 177.
64. Ramos, 861 F2d at 230. The language was added to prevent prosecution of a per-
son for inadvertently carrying a firearm in an obviously unrelated crime. Id.
65. United States v Henry, 878 F2d 937, 944 (6th Cir 1989).
66. United States v Payero, 888 F2d 928, 929 (1st Cir 1989).
67. Payero, 888 F2d at 929.
68. Stewart, 779 F2d at 540 (opinion by J. Kennedy).
1991
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Even if a firearm remains hidden throughout a crime, its concealed
presence may facilitate the crime by emboldening the defendant,
giving him or her the security and confidence needed to undertake
the criminal act.6 9
Something more than strategic proximity of drugs and firearms
is necessary for a conviction under section 924(c)(1).70 "The rela-
tion between the firearm and the underlying offense is an essential
element of the crime. ' 71 The phrase "in relation to" should be con-
strued to modify the "during" element, and although the "in rela-
tion to" language does not add a substantive element, or make sec-
tion 924(c)(1) a specific intent offense, it alters the nature of the
proof required to secure a conviction.72 The difficulty courts have
had in defining the relationship between a weapon and an underly-
ing narcotics offense is illustrated by United States v Morrow.73 In
Morrow a jury convicted defendants Timothy Wayne Morrow and
George Mooneyham of three drug-related offenses. The jury found
the defendants guilty on Count I of aiding and abetting the unlaw-
ful manufacture of marijuana under 21 USC §§ 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(C), and 18 USC § 2.1" The defendants were also con-
victed on Count II, conspiracy to manufacture marijuana in viola-
tion of 21 USC § 846,7" and on Count III, which charged that Moo-
neyham, aided and abetted by Morrow, carried a firearm during
and in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 USC
§ 924(c). 6
Morrow and Mooneyham were arrested by special agents of the
United States Forest Service as they tended plants in a large mari-
juana patch growing in the Cherokee National Forest in Tennes-
see. 77 As the defendants approached the marijuana patch, the
agents noted that one of them, Mooneyham, wore a holster con-
taning a handgun.7 s The defendants began cutting the plants once
they entered the patch and, ten minutes later, the agents con-
69. Id.
70. Wilson, 884 F2d at 177.
71. Stewart, 779 F2d at 540 (opinion by J. Kennedy). The failure to instruct upon
the necessary relationship warrants reversal where there is a significant possibility that the
jury might have acquitted if it had considered the matter. Id.
72. Brown, 915 F2d at 227.
73. 923 F2d 427 (6th Cir 1991), vacated, stay granted, reh'g en banc granted, 932 F2d
1146 (6th Cir 1991).
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fronted the defendants. 79 While Morrow was immediately appre-
hended, Mooneyham was captured about a half hour later after he
-ran into the woods.80 When Mooneyham was arrested the holster
was found to be empty. 1 A .22 caliber magnum revolver was later
found by the agents at the entrance to the marijuana field.82 It was
loaded and in working order.8 '
At trial, Mooneyham argued that the gun's only purpose was to
shoot snakes. 4 He testified that he was very frightened by
snakes, 5 and that the incidence of rattlesnakes at the Cherokee
National Forest is high. 8 "[T]he arresting agents testified that the
holster bore the inscription 'For Snakes Only' and that one of the
defendants, at the time of the arrest, stated that the pistol was 'for
snake purposes.' "T87 The district court instructed the jury that 18
USC § 924(c)(1):
makes it illegal to use or carry a firearm in relation to any drug trafficking
crime .... In order for the Government to carry its burden of proof,...
the Government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that; one, [the de-
fendant] unlawfully manufactured marijuana plants ... or conspired to
manufacture marijuana...; and secondly, that [the defendant] knowingly
and willfully carried a firearm during and in relation to this offense.88
On appeal, Mooneyham challenged the jury instructions, arguing
that the district court did not adequately instruct the jury on the
elements of section 924(c)(1)."9 Specifically, Mooneyham con-
tended that the court failed to advise the jury that the gun had to
be an integral part of the drug trafficking crime.90 The government,
in response, submitted that "in relation to" is not a term of art,










88. Id at 434.
89. Id at 433.
90. Id.
91. Id at 434. The government relied upon United States v Michaels, 911 F2d 131,
132 (8th Cir 1990), cert denied, - US -, 111 S Ct 981 (1991), to support its position.
Michaels expressed the view that the phrase "during and in relation to" imports no more
meaning than its plain language would suggest. The Michaels court upheld a jury instruc-
tion requiring "the jury to find at the very least, that the gun was available to the defend-
ant, and that its availability facilitated the carrying out of the drug trafficking crime."
1991
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 30:39
While the phrase "in relation to" does not create a separate sub-
stantive element, it nevertheless modifies the "during" element of
section 924(c)(1), and requires that a court explain that a rela-
tional connection is required for there to be a conviction.9 2 The
Morrow opinion, which has subsequently been vacated,93 said that
by simply mirroring the language of section 924(c)(1) itself, the in-
struction given by the district court failed to explain that "in rela-
tion to" modifies "during" and requires proof of a relationship be-
tween the firearm and the drug trafficking offense. 4 The court,
quoting United States v Brockington,5 went on to give an exam-
ple of an adequate jury instruction on section 924(c)(1):
[T]he government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm
had some relation to or some connection to the underlying crime. A firearm
can be used in relation to a felony involving drug trafficking, if the person
possessing it intended to use the gun as a contingency arose, for example, to
protect himself or make an escape possible. 6
The court concluded that "it is by no means inconceivable that a
rational jury could conclude that the pistol carried by Mooneyham
was solely for the purpose of shooting snakes, and not at all related
to the drug trafficking offenses.
'9 7
Despite being vacated by the Sixth Circuit, the Morrow analysis
illustrates the necessity for the government to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt some relation or connection between the underlying
drug transaction and the use or possession of the firearm. It is
Michaels, 911 F2d at 132.
92. Brown, 915 F2d at 226-27.
93. The case has been set for a rehearing en banc. Morrow, 932 F2d 1146 (6th Cir
1991).
94. Morrow, 923 F2d at 434. The court of appeals said that the district court erred by
not instructing more specifically on the relational aspect of the "during and in relation to"
element. Id. The court said that a "trial judge's responsibility in charging the jury goes
beyond merely reiterating the pertinent statute." Id.
95. 849 F2d 872 (4th Cir 1988).
96. Morrow, 923 F2d at 434, quoting Brockington, 849 F2d at 876.
Ironically, the Morrow panel cited cases containing other jury instructions with much less
stringent language than that in Brockington, which it concluded properly explained the re-
lationai requirement of § 924(c)(1): United States v Henning, 906 F2d 1392, 1397-98 (10th
Cir 1990), cert denied, - US-, 111 S Ct 789 (1991) (" 'if a firearm plays any role in a
drug trafficking offense or it facilitates the crime in any way, it is being used within the
meaning of section' 924(c)(1)"); Payero, 888 F2d at 929 (" '[m]ere possession of a weapon is
not enough .... Rather, the government must prove that the firearm facilitated the drug
trafficking crime in some way' "); United States v Poole, 878 F2d 1389, 1393 n.3 (11th Cir
1989) (" 'a firearm must play a purpose or a function in carrying out the drug trafficking
offense' ").
97. Morrow, 923 F2d at 435. The court of appeals said that "it is solely the function
of the jury to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses." Id.
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likely the Sixth Circuit will conclude, when the case is heard en
banc, that in order for there to be a conviction under section
924(c)(1), a district court must simply emphasize the relational ele-
ment between the firearm and the underlying narcotics transac-
tion. It is doubtful that trial courts will be required to use a Brock-
ington instruction, or an instruction ruling out all other possible
uses of a weapon, as long as the court instructs that it must be
proven that the possessor of the weapon intended to have the fire-
arm available for possible use during the narcotics transaction, or
that the weapon was strategically located for easy access during
the transaction." For conviction, the circumstances of the case
must simply demonstrate that the drug trafficker was in possession
or control of a firearm and that the firearm facilitated or aided the
crime by giving courage to one who had the opportunity and/or
ability to display or discharge the weapon to protect himself or in-
timidate others, whether or not such a display or discharge in fact
98. See Henry, 878 F2d at 944. In Rosado, 866 F2d 967 (7th Cir 1989), cert denied,
_ US -, 110 S Ct 255 (1989), the defendant was convicted of violating § 924(c)(1) when a
revolver was found in a jacket the defendant removed and placed in the front seat of a
nearby automobile just prior to consummating a narcotics transaction with undercover Drug
Enforcement Administration agents. The court found that although the weapon was not on
the defendant at the moment of his arrest, he clearly "used" and "carried" the firearm in
violation of § 924(c). Rosado, 866 F2d at 969. The court said the evidence at trial estab-
lished that the defendant put on and wore the jacket containing the concealed weapon to
the drug transaction, and availed himself of the protection which a gun offers in the acquisi-
tion and transportation of narcotics. Id. The court reasoned that the fact he never had the
opportunity to brandish or discharge his gun does not mean he did not "use" it. Id, citing
United States v Moore, 580 F2d 360, 362 (9th Cir 1978). "Its presence 'increased the likeli-
hood of success, without [it] he probably would not have sallied forth.'" Rosado, 866 F2d at
969-74.
In Ramos, 861 F2d 228 (9th Cir 1988), the defendant was convicted of violating §
924(c)(1) despite not personally possessing a firearm during the underlying drug transaction.
Defendant Ramos, while transporting a kilogram of cocaine, instructed his co-conspirator to
pull a .22 automatic pistol from under the car seat and look at it. Id at 230. The co-conspira-
tor testified that Ramos later pulled the firearm from under the seat "to defend himself"
when a "suspicious van appeared" while en route to the cocaine transaction. Id. The court
concluded that since the cocaine was of substantial value, a rational inference was that Ra-
mos intended to defend either the cocaine or himself when he pulled the weapon. Id. The
court rejected appellant Ramos' argument that it was almost a certainty he would have been
found not guilty if the "during and in relation to" instruction had been supplemented with
some further explanation of the term "in relation to." Id at 231. The court concluded there
was sufficient evidende to conclude the firearm may well have emboldened one or more of
the actors who had the opportunity to display or discharge the weapon to protect himself or
intimidate others. Id, citing Stewart, 779 F2d at 540 (opinion by J. Kennedy).
In Wilson, 884 F2d 174 (5th Cir 1989), the court found a sufficient relationship to support
a conviction where the evidence showed the defendant was carrying a handgun in his waist-
band when entering his vehicle, which contained methamphetamine, and where the defend-
ant reached for the weapon when the police approached him.
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took place."" A jury instruction is sufficient if it emphasizes that
there must be a linkage between possession of the firearm and the
underlying drug transaction. As long as the district judge properly
instructs on the relational requirement, a conviction under section
924(c)(1) will withstand appellate review if there is sufficient evi-
dence from which a jury could reasonably find the requisite con-
nection between the firearm and the predicate drug offense. 100 All
other possible uses of a weapon need not be eliminated for a con-
viction. In addition, it need not be proven that the firearm was
actually possessed during the commission of the underlying
offense. 10'
A. Section 924(c)(1) & The Fortress Theory
In cases where firearms are not found on the person of the de-
fendant, but are found on the premises under the control of the
drug offender, the courts have applied the fortress theory. The for-
tress theory is utilized where weapons are found on the premises of
which a drug trafficker is in actual or constructive possession. If
the firearms are intended to protect drugs or otherwise facilitate a
drug transaction, then such firearms are considered to have been
used by the defendant "during and in relation to" the drug traf-
ficking crime.
10 2
In United States v Matra,0 3 police found a large quantity of
cocaine, cash, and drug paraphernalia in the defendant's house.1
04
As police entered the house, they found Matra at the top of the
stairs leading to the second floor of the house. 0 5 Inside the second
floor bedrooms the police found a number of loaded firearms, in-
cluding a machine gun, readily available ammunition, a large quan-
tity of high-purity cocaine, and a large amount of cash. 0 6 None of
the items were in Matra's actual possession, but all of them were
considered to be under the defendant's control since they were
found in his house.10 7 The district court determined that Matra
had complete control of the house and he knew cocaine and a ma-
99. See United States v Henning, 906 F2d 1392, 1397-98 (10th Cir 1990), cert denied,
- US -, 111 S Ct 789 (1991); Michaels, 911 F2d at 132.
100. See Henning, 906 F2d at 1398.
101. See note 99, cases cited therein, and accompanying text.
102. United States v Matra, 841 F2d 837, 843 (8th Cir 1988).
103. 841 F2d 837 (8th Cir 1988).
104. Matra, 841 F2d at 838-40.
105. Id at 838.
106. Id at 839.
107. Id at 842.
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chine gun were in a bedroom on the second floor. 10 8 It was also
determined that Matra was a trusted member of a group that was
using the house to sell cocaine. 09 As a result, Matra was convicted
by the district court of violating section 924(c)(1).1l ° On appeal,
Matra urged the reviewing court to interpret the language of sec-
tion 924(c)(1) to preclude conviction unless the government
showed that the defendant actually possessed weapons during the
drug transaction."'
The Eighth Circuit rejected such a narrow interpretation of sec-
tion 924(c)(1) 1 2 and used a military analogy to support its posi-
tion. Military installations keep weapons readily available against
potential enemy attack; so, too, may weapons be kept ready to pro-
tect a drug house, thereby safeguarding and facilitating illegal drug
transactions." 3 The appellate court concurred in the district
court's observation that Matra's house was a veritable fortress."
4
It had only one usable entrance, which easily could be guarded
from a second-story window. 1 5 The court found that although Ma-
tra did not have possession of the machine gun or the other fire-
arms, he did have ready access to them." 6 Even though Matra did
108. Id at 839-40.
109. Id at 840.
110. Id at 838.
111. Id at 841-42 (emphasis added).
112. Id at 842.
113. Id. The Matra court began by analyzing United States v LaGuardia, 774 F2d 317
(8th Cir 1985). In LaGuardia police found a loaded pistol inside a purse on a bed, another
loaded pistol on a shelf in a closet among numerous items of clothing, and a rifle inside the
trunk of LaGuardia's car parked outside the apartment. LaGuardia, 774 F2d at 318. Ap-
proximately eighteen ounces of cocaine, at least $9,800 in cash, and various drug-related
items also were discovered on the premises. Id at 318-19. Recognizing the utility of firearms
to those who traffic in illegal drugs, the LaGuardia court held that the weapons, found in
connection with the cocaine and the cash, were sufficient to support the submission of the §
924(c) firearms charge to the jury. Id at 321. The court stated that "[tihe presence and
availability in light of the evident need demonstrates [sic] the use of the firearm to commit
the felony." Id.
The court also cited United States v Grant, 545 F2d 1309, 1312 (2d Cir 1976), where the
fortress analogy also was applied. The "fortress" in Grant was the Piggy Back Social Club,
which had television monitors located throughout, special reinforced doors, and heavy locks.
Matra, 841 F2d at 842. Guns were found in the Club, along with large quantities of cocaine,
marijuana, and material used to "cut" these substances. Id. Grant managed the Club and
apparently lived there. Id. The Second Circuit upheld Grant's conviction under the pre-1984
§ 924(c), finding that the evidence established that Grant had used the guns as part of a
tight security operation to protect large quantities of cocaine and hence to commit the fel-
ony of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. Id.
114. Matra, 841 F2d at 842.
115. Id.
116. Id at 843.
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not brandish or discharge a weapon, the court concluded that the
weapons were an integral part of his criminal undertaking and
their availability increased the likelihood that the criminal under-
taking would succeed.117 In the court's view, it would defy logic
and common sense to conclude Matra did not "use" the machine
gun within the meaning of section 924(c) during and in relation to
his possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.11 8
"Carries" does not necessarily require actual possession, and
"uses" does not require actual brandishment or display. The ele-
ments of section 924(c)(1) will be satisfied by a sturdy, subtle spi-
der's web, 9 such as the fortress theory, which encompasses the
defendant, the narcotics, and the firearm. Section 924(c)(1) should
be construed broadly to cover the gamut of situations where drug
traffickers have ready access to weapons with which they secure or
enforce their transactions. 20 The fortress theory demonstrates by
analogy that when evaluating whether a firearm was carried in re-
lation to an offense, the defendant's intentions as he engaged in
the precise conduct that comprised the predicate offense should
not be the sole focus.'21 Rather, the totality of circumstances sur-
rounding the commission of the crime must be examined: "the em-
boldened sallying forth, the execution of the transaction, the es-
cape, and the likely response to contingencies that might have
arisen during the commission of the crime. 12 2 In fortress type
cases, the sheer volume of weapons and drugs makes reasonable
the inference that the weapons involved were carried in relation to
the predicate drug offense since they increase the likelihood that
the drug offense will succeed.
2
1
B. Applying Section 924(c)(1) to Separate Underlying Predicate
Drug Trafficking Offenses
When a defendant is convicted of two separate underlying drug
trafficking crimes, i.e., manufacturing and possession with intent to




120. United States v Acosta-Cazares, 878 F2d 945, 952 (6th Cir 1989), cert denied, -
US -, 110 S Ct 255 (1989).
121. United States v Brown, 915 F2d 219, 226 (6th Cir 1990).
122. Brown, 915 F2d at 226.
123. United States v Wilson, 884 F2d 174, 177 (5th Cir 1989).
Vol. 30:39
1991 Elements of 18 USC § 924(c)(1) 55
section 924(c)(1) firearms charge.124 The two separate section
924(c)(1) counts will not be merged into a single count.125 This is
because two separate predicate offenses are chargeable-not be-
cause there may have been two or more firearms involved.
126
For example, in United States v Henry127 the defendant was
convicted of two separate drug offenses.1 2s At the time the defend-
ant was arrested, he was emerging from a car parked outside his
farm house. 2 As he exited the car, he was found to be in posses-
sion of a pistol.130 In addition, a rifle was later found inside his
house.131  The district court convicted Henry on two separate
counts of violating section 924(c)(1).
Counts three and four of Henry's indictment read:
COUNT 3
On or about the 21st day of September, 1987, in the Western District of
Kentucky, Jefferson County, Kentucky, LOUIS EDWARD HENRY, JR.,
during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, to-wit, manufacturing and
possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of
Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1), did use and carry a Model
59, Smith & Wesson 9 mm. semi-automatic pistol, bearing serial number
A6022721.
In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c)(1).
COUNT 4
On or about the 21st day of September, 1987, in the Western District of
Kentucky, Jefferson County, Kentucky, LOUIS EDWARD HENRY, JR.,
during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, to-wit, manufacturing and
possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of
Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1), did use and carry two (2)
firearms, to-wit, a .30 caliber U.S. carbine rifle, serial number unknown, and
a .22 caliber semi-automatic Beretta pistol, bearing serial number
8AS04453U.
In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c)(1).3
2
124. Henry, 878 F2d at 942. See also United States v Jim, 865 F2d 211 (9th Cir 1989)
(defendant in same escapade shot at three different federal officers and was convicted of
three counts of assault on a federal officer and three counts of using a firearm during a
crime of violence); United States v Fontanilla, 849 F2d 1257 (9th Cir 1988) (because mur-
der of one person and assault of another in the same episode were properly charged as
separate crimes, it was permissible to charge the defendant with two separate § 924(c)(1)
counts). Section 924(c)(1) "crime of violence" cases are analogous to "drug trafficking
crime" cases since the applicable statute makes no distinction between the two.
125. Henry, 878 F2d at 942.
126. Id.
127. 878 F2d 937 (6th Cir 1989).
128. Henry, 878 F2d at 942.
129. Id at 939.
130. Id.
131. Id at 940.
132. Id at 943.
Duquesne Law Review
On appeal, Henry's conviction on Count III was vacated.1 33 The
Sixth Circuit reasoned that the government failed to link the fire-
arms specifically to each one of the drug counts. Instead, the gov-
ernment made reference to both drug counts in each of the section
924(c)(1) firearm counts.3 The court said that section 924(c)(1)
requires that the firearm be used or carried "during and in rela-
tion" to a drug trafficking offense. 13 5 Since the government failed
to link a firearm to each of the predicate drug trafficking crimes, it
failed to show how the firearms related differently to each of the
predicate offenses.3 6 Thus, the court vacated Count III of Henry's
section 924(c)(1) conviction because the government had shown a
lesser relationship between the firearm and the drug trafficking
crime. 137 However, the court pointed out that if the government
had related a firearm to each of the separate drug trafficking of-
fenses, Henry's convictions on both section 924(c)(1) counts would
have been affirmed.'
C. Aiding & Abetting under Section 924(c)(1)
In order to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting, the gov-
ernment must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, both association
with and participation in the substantive crime.3 e To meet the
participation prong, the government must establish that the aider
and abettor did some affirmative act designed to further the crimi-
nal venture. 40
In Morrow, the government raised the inference that defendant
Morrow knew his co-defendant used and carried a gun while tend-
ing marijuana plants, and thus the gun's presence supported a con-




136. Id at 944-45.
137. Id at 945.
138. Id.
139. See Nye & Nissen v United States, 336 US 613, 619 (1949); United States v
Hughes, 891 F2d 597, 599 (6th Cir 1989).
The aiding and abetting statute reads:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or
another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.
Principals, 18 USCA § 2 (1969).
140. See Nye & Nissen, 336 US at 619; Hughes, 891 F2d at 599.
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tion 924(c) (1). 14' The court reasoned that while the government's
assertion may satisfy the association prong of the aiding and abet-
ting test, it failed to produce any evidence sustaining the participa-
tion prong-a necessary element of the crime. 11 2 The court ruled
that absent a showing of some active participation or encourage-
ment, or some affirmative act by Morrow designed to further his
co-defendant's use of the pistol during or in relation to the drug
trafficking crime, a conviction for aiding and abetting cannot
stand. 43
However, a myriad of section 924(c)(1) cases have shown that
the focus in a firearms prosecution is not on the presence of the
gun, per se, but rather is on the integral relationship the weapon
bears to the commission of the underlying criminal conduct.
4 4
Therefore, it may be more appropriate when addressing an aiding
and abetting charge in connection with section 924(c)(1) to focus
on the defendant's conduct with respect to the underlying narcot-
ics offense, rather than exploring the defendant's "association" and
"participation" with respect to the use or carrying of the
weapon. 45
Thus, the ultimate issue for determining whether a defendant
aided and abetted in the violation of section 924(c)(1) is whether,
from the totality of the circumstances, it can be concluded that the
accused aider and abettor actively participated in the underlying
substantive drug trafficking crime, and whether the accused knew
his co-defendant was using or carrying a gun during or in relation
to the underlying offense.' 46 Although the case law is not decisive,
in order for there to be a conviction for aiding and abetting under
section 924(c)(1), it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused aider and abettor at least had knowledge that his
co-defendant was "using" a firearm during or "in relation to" the
underlying, substantive drug trafficking offense.
141. Morrow, 923 F2d at 436. See notes 73 through 98 and accompanying text for the
facts of Morrow.
142. Morrow, 923 F2d at 436.
143. Id.
144. Id at 443. See Acosta-Cazares, 878 F2d at 951-52; United States v Robinson, 857
F2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir 1988); Matra, 841 F2d at 842; United States v Stewart, 779 F2d
538, 540 (9th Cir 1985); LaGuardia, 774 F2d at 321.




IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SECTION 924(c)(1)
It is conceivable that a vagueness issue may arise when applying
the mandatory five year sentence provision of section 924(c)(1). A
defendant may not be aware that the underlying drug trafficking
offense he committed can also result in an enhanced penalty if he
uses a firearm during or in relation to the drug trafficking crime.
For example, although a person carrying a firearm during a narcot-
ics transaction knows that selling drugs is illegal, he may not be
"on notice" that carrying the firearm is a separate offense.1 47 Be-
cause section 924(c)(1) may not give enough notice to a defendant,
and because the courts are given wide discretion in determining
whether a firearm was used "during and in relation to" a drug traf-
ficking crime, a defendant may mount a constitutional challenge.
148
Congress has the right to address public concern over the use of
firearms during certain crimes, but not at the expense of clarity.149
Before an accused can be punished, the crime of which he is ac-
cused must clearly appear within the statute, otherwise a defend-
ant's due process rights may be violated.150 A defendant may not
to be subject to a penalty unless the words of a statute plainly
impose it.' 5' However, because an act of Congress is presumptively
valid, a statute will not be held void simply because it is difficult to
determine whether certain marginal offenses fall within its
language.
152
In United States v Shaw, 53 an appellant charged with possess-
ing 117 grams of methamphetamine argued that conflicting penalty
schemes failed to give him adequate notice of the penalty to which
he would be exposed.15 4 While acknowledging the defendant's con-
stitutional entitlement to such notice, 15 5 the court noted that
"overlapping sentencing provisions satisfy the notice requirements
of the Due Process Clause so long as they clearly define the 'con-
147. Comment, 19 Loyola LA L Rev at 841 (cited in note 18).
148. Id at 842.
149. Id.
150. Id at 841, citing United States v Resnick, 299 US 207, 210 (1936). The Four-
teenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.. . ." US Const, Amend XIV, §1.
151. United States v Campos-Serrano, 404 US 293, 297 (1971), quoting Keppel v Tif-
fin Savings Bank, 197 US 356, 362 (1905).
152. Parker v Levy, 417 US 733, 757 (1974).
153. 920 F2d 1225 (5th Cir 1991), cert denied, - US -, 111 S Ct 2038 (1991).
154. Shaw, 920 F2d 1225.
155. See United States v Batchelder, 442 US 114, 123 (1979).
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duct prohibited and the punishment authorized.' "156 Section
924(c)(1) appears to apprise a defendant of the extra mandatory
five year sentence for "using" a firearm "during and in relation to"
a drug trafficking crime so long as a relationship of the firearm to
the drug trafficking crime can be proven. As such, a constitutional
challenge to section 924(c)(1) on vagueness grounds will most
likely fail.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applica-
ble to multiple prosecutions for the same offense.15 An argument
may be made that sentencing a defendant under section 924(c)(1)
and under the predicate drug trafficking offense penalizes the ac-
cused twice for the same offense. 158 However, in Missouri v
Hunter,159 the Supreme Court upheld a conviction under a deadly
weapon statute and under a felony statute where, the defendant
was subject to a five year sentence under the deadly weapon stat-
ute and to a three year sentence for committing the felony.160 The
Supreme Court held that convictions under both statutes did not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 6 ' The Court said that where a
legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under
two statutes, regardless of whether the two statutes proscribe the
same conduct, a court's task of statutory construction is at an end
and the court may impose cumulative punishment under such stat-
utes in a single trial.1 2 Given the holding in Hunter, it is unlikely
that section 924(c)(1) combined with a predicate drug offense will
be held to violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
The present version of section 924(c)(1) imposes severe sanc-
tions, in the form of a five year, non-parolable sentence, where a
firearm facilitated or had the potential of facilitating the commis-
sion of a drug trafficking crime. Section 924(c)(1) is not applicable
when one merely possesses a firearm during the commission of a
drug trafficking crime. The government must prove beyond a rea-
156. Shaw, 920 F2d at 1228, quoting Batchelder, 442 US at 123.
157. C. Whitebread, Criminal Procedure, An Analysis of Constitutional Cases and
Concepts 501 (Foundation Press 1980).
158. See Comment, 19 Loyola LA L Rev at 845 (cited in note 18).
159. 459 US 359 (1983).
160. Hunter, 459 US 359.




sonable doubt that the firearm was carried in relationship to the
underlying drug offense.
The "in relation to" language of section 924(c)(1) requires that
there be a causal connection between a defendant's narcotics fel-
ony and his firearm. 63 However, "carries" does not actually mean
actual possession, and "uses" does not mean actual brandishment
or display. The totality of the circumstances surrounding the com-
mission of the drug trafficking crime and the possession of the fire-
arm must be examined: "the emboldened sallying forth, the execu-
tion of the transaction, the escape, and the likely response to
contingencies that might have arisen during the commission of the
crime. 1 4 The elements of section 924(c)(1) will be satisfied by a
sturdy, subtle, "spider's web,"'1 65 which encompasses the defend-
ant, and shows a relationship between the narcotics and the fire-
arm. Whether there exists a web sturdy enough to support convic-
tion under section 924(c)(1) is ultimately a question for the trier of
fact.
163. Ramos, 861 F2d at 230.
164. Brown, 915 F2d at 226.
165. Grant, 545 F2d at 1312.
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